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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
ANGELO GIRON,

Case No. 960203-CA
Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellee.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from an order granting Defendant/Appellee
Angelo Giron's ("Giron") motion to suppress, entered in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable William B. Bohling, presiding.

Jurisdiction

is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996).

See also State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528

(Utah 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows:
1.

Did the trial court correctly rule that the state

failed to demonstrate the warrantless search of Giron's vehicle
was "incident to arrest" where the state presented no evidence in
support of that theory?
2.

Did the trial court correctly rule that impounding

Giron's vehicle was not justified where the state failed to
demonstrate necessity?
3.

Did the trial court correctly rule that the search of

Giron's vehicle was not justified as an "inventory search" where
1

the involved officer failed to comply with inventory search
procedures?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

A bifurcated review standard applies

with respect to each issue presented for review.

With regard to

the facts, the trial judges are "in the best position to assess
the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceedings as a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to
garner from a cold record." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36
(Utah 1994). Thus, this Court will review the trial court's
factual findings for clear error.
1182, 1186 (Utah 1995).

State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d

The facts will be considered in a light

most favorable to the trial court's determination.
P.2d at 935-36.

Pena, 869

This Court will review the trial court's

conclusions of law under a correctness standard.

The nature of

this particular determination of law allows the trial court "a
measure of discretion . . . when applying that standard to a
given set of facts."

Id. at 93 9.

RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions
will be determinative of the issues on appeal:
Utah Const, art. I, § 14.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached
Addendum A.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in the Court Below.
On January 25, 1995, Giron was charged by information with
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a 3rd° felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1953 as amended) .
(Record on Appeal ("R.") at 8-9.)

On May 15, 1995, he moved to

suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his car
in violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourth
Amendment of the federal constitution, and article I, section 14
of the Utah Constitution.

(R. 45-46.)

During an evidentiary

hearing on the matter, the state called the arresting officer,
Dale Bench ("Bench"), and Officer Anthony Russell ("Russell") to
testify. (R. 50; 124-178.)

Thereafter, each party submitted

memoranda to the trial court for review (R. 53-61; 62-69) and
presented oral argument on the matter.

(R. 70; 181-219.)

On October 30, 1995, the trial court granted the motion to
suppress.

(R. 70.)

The state filed a motion for reconsideration

(R. 78-81), which was denied.

(R. 91.)

The trial court entered

amended findings and conclusions (R. 92-96), a copy of which is
attached hereto as Addendum B, and the state requested dismissal
of the charge against Giron on the basis that the state had
insufficient evidence to proceed. The trial court granted the
request for dismissal (R. 108-10), and the state filed a notice
of appeal (R. 114-115) followed by a motion for summary reversal
(Motion for Summary Reversal, dated 4/10/96), which this Court
denied. (Order, dated 5/28/96.)
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 22, 1995, Officer Bench ("Bench") observed Giron
execute an improper U-turn in his vehicle, prompting Bench to
activate his overhead lights and follow Giron until he stopped at
a curbside.

(R. 124-126.)

Bench asked Giron for a driver's

license, and he produced a Utah identification card.

Giron's

passenger, Zaragoza, exited the vehicle and in so doing dropped
an unidentified item.

Bench suspected the item was narcotics (R.

126-127; State's Brief ("S.B.") at 4) but never confirmed his
suspicions.

Bench's partner, Officer Ruth ("Ruth"), chased

Zaragoza on foot to Zaragoza's backyard, where they engaged in a
struggle.

(R. 126-127; 150-151.)

Upon observing the struggle,

Bench instructed Giron to stay put, then he proceeded to
Zaragoza's backyard to assist Ruth.

It was possible Giron did

not hear or understand Bench's instructions. (R. 127-128; 152.)
He left the area.

(R. 128.)

After Bench and his partner apprehended Zaragoza, Bench ran
a records check on Giron and learned his driver's license was
suspended.
129.)

Bench also learned Giron's home address.

(R. 128-

Bench "responded to the address" approximately "three

hours" after the initial stop and determined "nobody was at
home". (R. 129.) Upon leaving the area, Bench noticed Giron and a
second passenger in the car. (R. 130.)

Bench immediately acti-

vated his lights and pursued them. Giron pulled to a stop along
the curb "right across the street from his house." (R. 130; 153.)
Bench approached Giron in the vehicle and told him he was
4

under arrest for failing to obey the lawful order of a police
officer.

(R. 130-131; 154.)

Bench then asked Giron to step out

of the car, placed handcuffs on Giron and placed him in the
police vehicle.

(R. 131; 154-155.) Bench then obtained

registration information for the car and ran a computer check on
it.

(R. 155.)

Sometime thereafter, Bench searched the car and

found contraband. (R. 132-133.)
The evidence fails to support the notion that Bench engaged
in a standardized "inventory" search.

With respect to

impoundment, the record is void of evidence that Bench actually
assessed whether Giron's passenger could drive Giron's car from
directly across the street where it was parked on the curbside
into Giron's driveway (R. 156); Bench admittedly failed to check
whether some alternative to impounding the vehicle existed (R.
156); Bench failed to ask Giron whether "there were any neighbors
or some other person who could drive [the] car into his driveway
across the street from where he was parked."

(R. 157.)

In addition, Bench failed to comply with inventory
procedures.

Although he had pen and paper available for the

purpose of conducting an inventory search, he did not have those
items "in hand" and he made "no list whatsoever of what [he]
found in the vehicle." (R. 158-159.)

After Bench "completed" (R.

159) the search of the vehicle, he dispatched for Officer
Russell. (R. 159-160.)

When Russell arrived at the scene, he was

aware that Bench had searched the car for drugs. (R. 174-75.)
However, Bench made no indication to Russell that he had
5

initiated an inventory search of the car. (R. 173-174.) Thus,
Russell performed an inventory search from top to bottom "as if
nothing had been done" -- as if "Bench had never been in that
vehicle."

(R. 174.)

Salt Lake Policies and Procedures on Impound state the
following:
To avoid needless expense and inconvenience to the vehicle
owner, officers shall use discretion in determining whether
or not a vehicle should be impounded.
•

B.

*

*

Vehicle Inventory

A thorough inventory search will be made of all vehicles
being impounded (ref. § 4-04-03.05). A thorough inventory
search will include: [interior, trunk, closed containers,
etc.]
•

*

*

The officer will include in the initial report:
1.
Valuables placed into evidence[.]
2.
Valuable items left in the vehicle because of the
difficulty of transporting them to evidence (large
machinery, etc.) will be listed in the report's
details.
3.
If no valuables are found in the vehicle, the officer
will note that information in the report's details.
(State's Exhibit 1-S; R. 162-63.)

Bench acknowledged that

specific guidelines mandate that an officer document certain
inventory procedures contemporaneous with the inventory search.
(R. 166.)

Bench did not document in writing information relevant

to the search.

(R. 158-59.)

During an evidentiary hearing in this matter, Russell
testified that when he arrived, he conducted an inventory,
prepared an inventory report, and called a tow truck to remove
the vehicle. (State's Exhibit S-2; R. 167-168.)

Russell

documented in writing the items that were in the vehicle and the
6

vehicle's condition pursuant to the impound policy.

(R. 169.)

He reiterated the importance of documenting inventory search
procedures contemporaneous with performing them. (R. 172.)
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing and following
oral argument on the matter, the trial court stated in part the
following:
The burden rests with [the prosecutor] to establish that
[the impound] procedures were merely one of securing the
automobile and protecting both the interests of the state
and the defendant civilly [to justify the inventory search].
[T]he procedures followed by officer Bench certainly belie
such a motivation on the part of the state and would
indicate that in fact an investigatory search was underway,
not simply an inventory for the civil aspects of the search.
[T]he failure to follow what appeared to be the proper
policies of the [police department] are a basis upon which
the court finds that the manner of the search as well as the
basis for the search was not proper.
As to the issue of the search incident to an arrest,
the court again finds that there seemed to have been no
basis to do so. Perhaps most notable is that the record
that was established with the testimony of the officers gave
no indication that the search was undertaken for such a
purpose.
•

*

*

[T]here were two searches [of the vehicle] and the one that
was in question was [the one] by officer Bench. But the
court believes that was clearly not performed with the
intent to conduct the inventory search, but quite to the
contrary, a search for contraband. . . .
(R. 215-19.) The trial court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law granting Giron's motion to suppress the
evidence. (R. 92-96.)

The trial court's ruling focuses on

Bench's search of the vehicle.

(R. 233.) The state has appealed

from those findings and conclusions.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The state failed to present evidence in support of its
7

argument that the warrantless search of Giron's vehicle was
justified under the incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant
requirements of the state and federal constitutions.

Because of

the lack of evidence, the state failed to overcome the
presumption that the search was unreasonable.
In addition, the state argued the search of Giron's vehicle
was justified under the "inventory" exception to the Fourth
Amendment of the federal constitution and article I, section 14
of the Utah Constitution.

In connection with that argument, the

state failed to demonstrate that Bench lawfully impounded Giron's
vehicle before the search.

Under the Utah Constitution, police

are constitutionally required to seek an alternative disposition
of an arrestee's vehicle before they may impound it.

The

alternative-disposition inquiry goes to the issue of "necessity"
of impoundment.

In this matter, Bench made no alternative-

disposition inquiry.
Further, although Bench claimed he engaged in an "inventory"
search of the vehicle, he failed to follow standardized
procedures.

The facts and inferences surrounding the search

support the trial court's determination that Bench used it as a
ruse for rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.
Because the state failed to demonstrate that the search was
justified under the inventory exception, the trial court
correctly granted Giron's motion to suppress the evidence.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE
STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT BENCH'S SEARCH WAS
INCIDENT TO ARREST,
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The general rule under the Fourth Amendment requires
officers to obtain a warrant based on probable cause before
searching an area where an individual has a "reasonable
'expectation of privacy.'"

State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979,

985 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted). "Warrantless searches
are per se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement."

State v.

Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (citing Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 (1967)); State v.
Wells, Case No. 950773 (Utah App. November 21, 1996) .
Only narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement
exist.

Strickling, 844 P.2d at 985.

Where officers conduct a

warrantless search, the state has the burden of establishing that
the circumstances of the search "constitute an exception to the
warrant requirement." Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 762 (1969); State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah
1984)).
Establishing an exception is a highly fact intensive
9

proposition. See State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1252-53 (Utah
App. 1990).

Thus, the state's analysis concerning error must

begin with the facts and circumstances properly marshaled in
favor of the trial court's findings.

See State v. Teuscher, 883

P.2d 922, 930 (Utah App. 1994).
In this matter, the trial court found the following with
regard to Bench's search of the vehicle:
4.
After placing Mr. Giron under arrest and placing
Mr. Giron in his (Bench's) vehicle, Officer Bench requested
and obtained registration information relevant to Mr.
Giron's vehicle which indicated that the vehicle was
lawfully registered and licensed.
5.
Subsequent to obtaining the registration
information, Officer Bench initiated a search of Defendant's
car which revealed controlled substances.
•

*

*

7.
That at the time he conducted a search of Mr.
Giron's vehicle, Officer Bench expressly justified the
search as an inventory, which he stated was necessary as a
result of a need to impound Mr. Giron's vehicle.
8.
That Officer Bench never asked the Defendant if
his passenger could accept custody of the vehicle, if there
was someone in his home that could accept custody of the
vehicle, and never inquired of Mr. Giron's passenger if he'd
be willing to take custody of the vehicle.
9.
The reported inventory search conducted when
Officer Bench in this case was carried out in a manner
contrary to established Salt Lake City Police Procedures for
an inventory search in the following particulars:
(a) Inventory forms were not used.
(b) No written list of items found was made.
(c) There was no attempt to contemporaneously record
what was found where.
(d) There was not attempt to involve Mr. Giron, his
passenger, or others at Mr. Giron's residence in the
decisions to impound.

10. Although Officer Bench articulated that his
purpose in searching Mr. Giron's car was to inventory the
items in the vehicle, his actions in searching the vehicle,
his testimony, and his demeanor upon the witness stand
indicated that the search was conducted for an investigatory
police purpose.
11. At the time Officer Bench searched Mr. Giron's
car, any possibility of Mr. Giron gaining access to the car
for purposes of recovering a weapon, or concealing or
10

destroying evidence had been completely eliminated by the
arrest, handcuffing, and the removal of [Mr. Giron] from the
area of the vehicle.
•

*

*

1.
That as a result the Defendant's vehicle being
parked directly across from his residence, impoundment was
neither authorized nor necessary.
2.
Even assuming arguendo the impound was justified,
the "inventory" search was merely a pretext for an
investigatory search for evidence.
3.
That at the time of the search [Mr. Giron] had
been secured and removed from the area, that there
was no

physical

or temporal

proximity

to the arrest,

and no basis

to justify the search of [Mr. Giron's] vehicle as a search
incident to arrest.
(R. 93-95 (emphasis added).)
Those findings and conclusions are consistent with the
facts, which reflect that Bench conducted a search of the vehicle
some unspecified time after he arrested Giron. (R. 131-133; 155.)
The search was conducted for investigatory reasons where Bench
failed to comply with impounding and inventory procedures. (R.
156-160.)

Bench "completed" the investigatory search, then

contacted Russell, who arrived at the scene and performed an
inventory search from top to bottom "as if nothing had been done"
-- as if "Bench had never been in that vehicle."

(R. 174.) Based

on Bench's testimony and his demeanor on the witness stand, the
trial court was not persuaded by Bench's characterization of the
search as an "inventory" search or the state's claim that the
search was incident to arrest. "The procedures followed by
Officer Bench certainly belie such a motivation on the part of
the state and would indicate that in fact an investigatory search
was underway."

(R. 216.)

Notwithstanding the facts, the state seeks reversal of the
11

trial court's ruling on the basis that Bench conducted the
warrantless search pursuant to the "incident-to-arrest"
exception.

That exception failed to justify Bench's conduct as

set forth below.
A.
THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE
"INCIDENT TO ARREST" EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH.
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the United
States Supreme Court ruled that contemporaneous with arrest, it
is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the area into
which the arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items, i.e. the area within the arrestee's "immediate
control."

Id. at 763.

A warrantless search "incident to arrest"

is justified if the state can show that certain temporal and
geographical factors and exigent circumstances existed at the
time of the arrest.

Id. at 764; see also, Shipley v. California,

395 U.S. 818, 819-20 (1969); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33
(1970); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 272 n. 2 (Utah 1985)
(Zimmerman, J., concurring) (limiting warrantless search to "an
area within which a suspect could reasonably be expected to grab
a weapon or destroy evidence"); State v. Ricks, 816 P.2d 125, 128
(Alaska 1991) (a search remote in time or place from arrest
cannot be justified).
In connection with the state's claim in its brief that
Bench's search was "incident to arrest," the state ignores the
exigency factor and disregards the lack of evidence concerning
"immediate control" and temporal proximity.
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Although the state

is well aware that it is required to marshal all evidence and
inferences in support of the trial court's ruling, it has failed
to do so.

Among other things, the state makes no mention of the

time lapse between the arrest and the search, or of the fact that
Bench obtained registration information for the car and engaged
in a computer check sometime after
search.1

the arrest

but before

the

Those facts dispel the notion that the search was a

contemporaneous incident of the arrest.
Likewise, the state presented no evidence at the evidentiary
hearing to support the spatial proximity requirement. The trial
court correctly found that the state failed to prove the
physical or temporal proximity requirements. (R. 95.)
In addition, according to Bench, the officers were dealing
with a static situation. The threat that Giron would injure the
officers or destroy evidence did not exist, since Giron was
handcuffed, in police custody, and in the police car at the time
of the search. The trial court properly determined that where the
evidence failed to rebut the presumption, the warrantless search
could not be justified.

See Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1253.

1

In its Motion for Summary Reversal, the state improperly assumed
the temporal requirement was met "because [the search] was completed
before the tow truck arrived to take the vehicle to the police impound
lot, and before Giron himself had been transported to jail." (State's
Motion for Summary Reversal, dated 4/10/96, at 2.) That statement
reflected only that the search was made, not that it was a
contemvoraneous
incident
of the arrest. In its Brief, the state has
refrained from engaging in such unfounded speculation. Its silence
suggests it has conceded the lack of evidence concerning temporal
proximity.
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The trial court's ruling is consistent with the law set
forth in cases cited by the state. The courts have required the
governmental entity to demonstrate the search was a
contemporaneous incident of the arrest and limited to the area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items, i.e. the area within the arrestee's "immediate
control."

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).

In

addition, the courts have imposed an exigency element: the search
is justified where a threat to the officers' safety exists.
In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), a single officer
engaged in a high speed chase, overtook the vehicle and four
passengers, pulled the vehicle over, ordered its occupants out of
the car, observed evidence of marijuana in plain view, arrested
the four occupants, and searched them and the vehicle contemporaneous to the arrest.

Id. at 455-56.

The search yielded

cocaine, which Belton moved to suppress as evidence.

On appeal,

the Supreme Court determined the search was valid as
contemporaneous to the arrests and recognized safety concerns:
[T]he "search was conducted by a lone peace officer who was
in the process of arresting four unknown individuals whom he
had stopped in a speeding car owned by none of them and
apparently containing an uncertain quantity of a controlled
substance. The suspects were standing by the side of the
car as the officer gave it a quick check to confirm his
suspicions before attempting to transport them to police
headquarters..."
Id. at 457.

The Belton Court further established the

considerations incident to arrest by adopting a bright-line test:
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[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
contemporaneous
incident
of that arrest,
search the passenger compartment of
that automobile.
Id. at 466 (emphasis added).
After Belton, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Kent, 665
P.2d 1317 (Utah 1983), also emphasized the safety of the officers
as a consideration: Officers surrounded a trailer that housed
parolees and a suspect of several armed robberies.

During the

surveillance, defendant drove up, entered the trailer, went back
to his car, and into the trailer again.

Thereafter, officers

ordered the trailer occupants to surrender, defendant came out,
sounded his automobile horn, and began to drive away.

Other

occupants bolted from the trailer and took off running in
different directions.
[Defendant] was stopped, handcuffed and required to lie on
the ground adjacent to his automobile . . . [H]e remained
within reach of the automobile. Also other suspects were
loose in the area and firearms were being discharged.
Id. at 1318.

Contemporaneous to the arrest, the police officer

observed shotgun shells in the defendant's automobile in plain
view and asked the defendant if he had a gun.

"Receiving no

reply, [the officer] looked under the seat and observed the
barrel of a sawed-off shotgun."

Id.

The Utah Supreme Court

justified the search contemporaneous to the arrest where there
was "an obvious threat to safety."

Id.2

2

The state also has cited to State v. Harrison, 805 P. 2d 769 (Utah
App. 1991) . As this Court has recognized, that case is distinguishable.
[T] he defendant was arrested on a public sidewalk in the company of
(continued...)
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Likewise, in In re K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981), the
officer observed drug paraphernalia and open containers in plain
view in the defendant's pickup truck, the officer arrested the
defendant and an occupant, and contemporaneous thereto, with the
arrestees standing unrestrained "near the side of the pickup,"
the officer searched the truck. Id. at 1045-46; see also State v.
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (search incident to arrest
exception based on probable cause and exigent circumstances).
The state suggests that in light of the cases cited above,
and State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 916
P.2d 909 (Utah 1996), the facts and circumstances of this matter
justify the warrantless search of Giron's automobile. (S.B. at
14.)

Moreno concerns the temporal aspect of the search: The

warrantless search must be a contemporaneous incident of the
arrest to be valid.

Id. at 1247. The lack of evidence in this

case to support temporal proximity and exigent circumstances
compels affirming the trial court's ruling.

No evidence exists

in this case bearing on the search as a contemporaneous incident
of the arrest.

Without such evidence, the state cannot establish

that the trial court's finding, "that there was no physical or
2

(...continued)
his wife and babies. Id. at 773. The Harrison court relied on the
search incident to arrest line of cases involving searches of
automobiles and noted the public nature of the arrest meant "there
was no way to secure [the diaper bag] at the scene pending the
obtaining of a warrant to search it. The bag, stroller, and babies
were going to be moved. Additionally, babies being babies, somebody
would need to get into the bag before long."

State v. Wells, Case No. 950773 (Utah App. November 21, 1996) .
events surrounding the search in Harrison are not comparable.
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The

temporal proximity to the arrest" (R. 95), is clearly erroneous.
In addition, the state cannot overcome the presumption that the
warrantless search was unreasonable.
B. THE STATE CONSTITUTION PROTECTS GIRON FROM THE
WARRANTLESS SEARCH CONDUCTED BY POLICE IN THIS MATTER.
The trial court also invalidated the warrantless search
under the Utah Constitution.

Article I, section 14 is identical

in part to the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution, but
is given more force.

See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-68

(Utah 1990); accord. State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah
1991); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416-17 (Utah 1991). 3

3

The majority of the Utah Supreme Court has supported at various
times analyzing art. I, sec. 14 in a manner separate from the fourth
amendment in order to provide the citizens of Utah with greater,
predictable protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. See
Justice Durham's plurality opinion in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460,
461, 473 (Utah 1990) , joined by Chief Justice Zimmerman; Chief Justice
Zimmerman's concurring opinion in State v. Anderson, 910 P. 2d 1229, 1239
(Utah 1996) ("I must point out that the lead opinion's directive to Utah
courts to construe article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution in a
manner similar to constructions of the Fourth Amendment except in
compelling circumstances is not supported by a majority of this court and
is not Utah law . . .
[I] fault the lead opinion for blindly adhering
to federal precedent on this [search and seizure] issue"); and Justice
Howe's lead opinion in State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416 (Utah 1991)
(interpreting article I, section 14 to provide greater protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures than federal counterpart).
Associate Chief Justice Stewart concurred in the result in Larocco, but
has not yet committed to accepting the constitutional theories set forth
in that case. See State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 536 (Utah 1994) .
Notwithstanding, Associate Chief Justice Stewart embraces the court's
responsibility to independently interpret Utah constitutional provisions :
If this Court were to view its constitutional duty to construe the
provisions in the Utah Declaration of Rights in the exact same
manner as the United States Supreme Court construes analogous
provisions in the Bill of Rights, we would violate the spirit and
intended effect of Utah constitutional law and policy as established
by the framers of the Utah Constitution.
Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1240 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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But see id. at
(continued...)

The drafters of the Utah Constitution intended to afford the
Utah provision more force and to provide the citizens of this
State with greater protections from governmental intrusions.
According to Mormon history, Utah pioneers suffered persecution
at the hands of murderous mobs in Ohio and Illinois, fled the
extermination order of Missouri's Governor Boggs,4 and suffered
more persecution in the Utah Territory from federal marshals
engaged in warrantless raids of their property in search of
polygamy-law offenders. Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search ad
Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, Article I,
Section 14, 17 J. Contemp. L. 267, 276 (1991) ; Panek, Search and
Seizure in Utah: Recounting the Antipolvcramv Raids, 62 Utah
Historical Quarterly 316 (1994) (hereinafter "Panek"). The
newspaper recounted the warrantless raids as "outrages," "carried
out without even a warrant giving the perpetrators the authority
[to search]."

Panek at 327 (quoting, Deseret News, March 10,

1886). The original Utah pioneers strongly supported state's
rights. Firmage and Mangrum, Zion in the Courts 7 (1988)
(hereinafter referred to as "Firmage").
3

(...continued)
1235 (Justice Russon: "Although we are obligated to provide a state law
review, such an independent analysis is not necessarily a
different
analysis").
4

Governor Lilburn Boggs of Missouri issued the infamous
"extermination order" to General Samuel D. Lucas of the State Militia,
as follows: "The ringleaders of this rebellion should be made an example
of; and if it should become necessary for the public peace, the 'Mormons'
should be exterminated, or expelled from the state."
Firmage and
Mangrum, Zion in the Courts, 74, 82 (1988). Shortly after Boggs issued
the extermination order, a mob led by the state militia massacred a
number of Mormons, including children, at Hauns Mill and arrested leaders
of the Mormon church. Jd. at 74.
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In support of state's rights, the Utah Supreme Court has
adopted a separate and distinct post-Belton automobile exception
to the warrant requirement of art. I, sec. 14 and has eliminated
"some of the confusing exceptions to the warrant requirement that
have been developed by federal law in recent years."

Larocco,

794 P.2d at 469.
Specifically, [Utah courts] will continue to use the concept
of expectation of privacy as a suitable threshold criterion
for determining whether article I, section 14 is applicable.
Then if article I, section 14 applies, warrantless searches

will be permitted only where they satisfy
their
traditional
justification,
namely, to protect the safety of police or
the public or to prevent the destruction
of evidence.
See
id.; see also, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752[.]
As Justice Zimmerman explained in Hygh:
Once the threat that the suspect will injure the officers
with concealed weapons or will destroy evidence is gone,
there is no persuasive reason why the officers cannot take
the time to secure a warrant. Such a requirement would
present little impediment to police investigations,
especially in light of the ease with which warrants can be
obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant statute, U.C.A.,
1953, § 77-23-4 (2) .
Id. at 469-70 (emphasis added).

In applying art. I, sec. 14, the

Utah courts have consistently held that the warrantless search of
a vehicle may be justified only when probable cause and exigent
circumstances exist.

See Sims v. State Tax Com'n, 841 P.2d 6, 8-

9 (Utah 1992); State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1192-94 (Utah App.
1991).

The probable cause/exigent circumstances inquiry provides

Utah citizens with more protections from automobile searches than
the federal "incident-to-arrest" exception, which fails to
consider whether the officer had articulable probable cause to
conduct the search.
In the event Belton fails to provide arrestees with the
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protections from warrantless searches identified in Larocco, this
Court must affirm the trial court's ruling on the basis that the
search was unreasonable under art. I, sec. 14.

Other states have

refused to adopt the rule of Belton under relevant state
constitutional provisions in connection with automobile searches
incident to arrests.

See State v. Brown, 588 N.E.2d 113, 115

(Ohio 1992), cert, denied, 121 L.Ed.2d 127 (1992) (declining
under state constitution to adopt rule of Belton); State v.
Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 959-60 (N.J. 1994) (under state
constitution Belton shall not apply).
The evidence before this Court refutes, among other things,
the existence of an exigency and probable cause at the time of
the search.

(See Point I.A., supra.)

Thus, there is no

persuasive reason why, under art. I, sec. 14, the officer could
not have taken the time to secure a warrant.

That result is

implicit in the trial court's findings and conclusions, where it
ruled the search was violative of "Defendant's right to be free
from illegal searches and seizures as guaranteed by our . . .
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution."

(R. 95.)

Consistent with the trial court's ruling that the search
violated the Utah Constitution (R. 95) and the proposition that
"this Court may affirm the trial court's decision on any proper
ground," Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1247 n.l, the analysis under art. I,
section 14 is sufficient basis for affirming the trial court's
decision that the search was impermissible.
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POINT II. THE SEARCH WAS INVALID AS AN "INVENTORY SEARCH"
WHERE THE INVOLVED OFFICER UNLAWFULLY IMPOUNDED THE CAR
AND/OR FAILED TO COMPLY WITH STANDARDIZED PROCEDURES FOR
INVENTORYING THE CONTENTS OF THE CAR.
A routine inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle
is also a recognized exception to the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.

See South Dakota v. Qpperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).

In Qpperman, the United States Supreme Court recognized inventory
searches serve three purposes:

(1) "the protection of the

owner's property while it remains in police custody," (2) the
protection of "the police against claims or disputes over lost or
stolen property," and (3) "the protection of the police from
potential danger."

Qpperman, 428 U.S. at 370; see also State v.

Johnson, 745 P.2d 452# 454 (Utah 1987) (citing Qpperman, 428 U.S.
at 369-70). Based on these purposes and the lesser expectation of
privacy in vehicles, the United States Supreme Court has
concluded that inventory searches of lawfully impounded vehicles
are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even though such
searches are not based on probable cause, so long as officers
follow standardized procedures for inventorying the contents of a
lawfully impounded vehicle and there is no suggestion that the
inventory "was a pretext concealing an investigatory police
motive."

Qpperman, 428 U.S. at 376.

The Utah courts likewise have discussed the parameters of
inventory searches in Strickling, 844 P.2d at 985; State v. Rice,
717 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 1986); State v. Stercrer, 808 P.2d 122,
124-26 (Utah App. 1991); Hvcrh, 711 P.2d at 268-70; and State v.
Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454-55 (Utah 1987) .
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Those cases along

with Opperman, and additional authority from the United States
Supreme Court, support the following: (1) the state has the
burden of establishing "the necessity for the taking and the
inventory of the vehicle" (Hycrh, 711 P.2d at 268); (2) the
vehicle must be lawfully impounded for the inventory search to be
reasonable (Hycrh, 711 P. 2d at 268; Rice, 717 P. 2d at 696;
Stercrer, 808 P.2d at 125 ("the impoundment and inventory search
of defendant's car" must be justified)); (3) the inventory search
must be conducted according to standardized procedures which are
designed to produce an inventory of the items in the vehicle and
not as a "fishing expedition for evidence" (Sterger, 808 P.2d at
125); (4) the State has the burden of introducing evidence that
such a standardized, reasonable procedure exists and that the
challenged police activity was essentially in conformance "with
that procedure" (Strickling, 844 P.2d at 988 (quoting Hygh, 711
P.2d at 269 (quoting 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.4, at 57677 (1978)))); and (5) an inventory search cannot be conducted as
a pretext for investigating criminal activity and searching for
evidence of a crime (Hycrh, 711 P. 2d at 268; Rice, 717 P. 2d at
696) .
The trial court in this matter ruled the search was invalid
under the "inventory" exception where impoundment was not
authorized or necessary, Bench failed to conduct the search in
accordance with standardized procedures, and the search yielding
contraband was conducted as a pretext for investigating criminal
activity and searching for evidence of a crime. (R. 95.) The
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trial court's ruling is correct.
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE IMPOUNDMENT WAS
NOT AUTHORIZED OR NECESSARY.
In considering the validity of an inventory search, the
Court "must first determine whether there was reasonable and
proper justification for the impoundment of the vehicle. . . . If
the impoundment was neither authorized nor necessary, the search
was unreasonable."

Hycrh, 711 P.2d at 268 (cites omitted).

The

state bears the burden of proving reasonableness, justification,
authorization, and necessity for the impoundment.

Id.

The state has acknowledged that the Utah Supreme Court in
Hycrh ruled that as part of the necessity inquiry, "police are
constitutionally required to seek alternative disposition of an
arrestee's vehicle before they may impound it; in other words, [J
police must show 'necessity7 of impoundment."
711 P.2d at 268-70.

(S.B. 18); Hycrh,

Thus, the officer is required to give the

defendant the opportunity to arrange for disposition of his own
car, i.e. for a release of the car to "a party designated by the
owner rather than be impounded."

Hycrh, 711 P.2d at 268. The

alternative-disposition inquiry is mandated under Hygh and is a
consistent alternative to impoundment, where the arrestee is
given the opportunity to make arrangements to protect his own
property, thereby releasing the police of any responsibility for
the car. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 (for purposes of
impoundment exception).
The state disregards the Utah precedent as "dictum" and
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asserts the law established in Hygh "has been repudiated" by the
United States Supreme Court in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,
375 (1987).

(S.B. at 17-18.) According to the state, in Bertine

the Court ruled officers have discretion to impound an arrestee's
vehicle "so long as discretion is exercised according to standard
criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of
criminal activity," and that such discretion has no relation to
the "proximity of an arrestee's automobile to his or her
residence" or the "need" to impound. Id. (S.B. 16.) The state's
reliance on Bertine is too limiting as set forth below.
1. The State Has Failed to Take into Consideration the Fact
that the Court in Hygh Relied in Part on the Utah
Constitution to Invalidate the Search; Thus, Hycrh Cannot Be
Repudiated by Federal Case Law.
In mandating the "alternative-disposition" inquiry, the Hygh
court relied in part on the state constitutional provision
proscribing unreasonable searches and seizures.

Hygh, 711 P.2d

at 2 64 (citing to U.S. Const, amend. IV; and Utah Const, art. I,
§14).

A federal court cannot repudiate a state's interpretation

of a state constitutional provision. Hygh supports the
determination that under the Utah Constitution,

an officer must

make the "alternative-disposition" inquiry for the necessity
showing to justify impoundment.

Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268-70

(relying on expanded protections under Utah Const, art. I, § 14) .
That determination does not reach the Fourth Amendment issue
addressed in Bertine.
Indeed, this Court has acknowledged that Hygh controls when
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assessing a search under art. I, § 14.

State v. Gray, 851 P.2d

1217, 1221 (Utah App. 1993). In addition, in a plurality opinion
the Utah Supreme Court looked to Hygh in "applying an automobile
exception to the warrant requirement of article I, section 14 of
the Utah Constitution."
(Utah 1990) .

State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469-70

Hygh continues to be sound precedent for

interpreting art. I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
2.
To the Extent Bertine Is in Conflict with Hvcrh,
Should Be Reaffirmed Under the Utah Constitution.

Hygh

Where a subsequent United States Supreme Court decision
conflicts with existing Utah case law, it is appropriate to
consider whether the prior Utah decision should be reaffirmed
under state constitutional provisions.

See In re Criminal

Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 650 (Utah 1988) (reaffirming the
holding in State v. Ruggeri, 429 P.2d 969, 975 (Utah 1967), under
the Utah constitution).

In In re Criminal Investigation, 754

P.2d at 633, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether a witness
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury pursuant to the Utah
Subpoena Powers Act was entitled to protections in the form of
warnings against compelled self-incrimination.

The court

determined the Act "raise [d] sufficient self-incrimination
concerns" that some form of warning would be required.

Id. at

648. Thus, the court fashioned a five-part warning using Miranda
as a guide.

The "fifth" part of the warning would apply "only to

'targets' of the [grand jury] investigation.

Such persons must

be notified prior to questioning or the compelled production of
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evidence of their target status and of the nature of the charges
under consideration against them."

Id. at 649.

The Utah court recognized that in considering a similar
issue, the United States Supreme Court refused to adopt a warning
under the fifth amendment applicable to "target" witnesses.

Id.

at 649-50 (considering U.S. v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977)).
11

[T] he entire tone of Washington constrains us from finding that

the federal constitution requires routine target warnings in the
context of all Subpoena Powers Act interrogations."

Id. at 650.

The Utah court next considered "whether, as a matter of state
law, we will require target warnings" under article I, section 12
of the Utah Constitution.

Id. at 650.

Fully ten years before Washington, this Court ruled in State
v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 225, 429 P.2d 969, 975 (1967),
that article I, section 12 requires that state grand jury
witnesses be notified of their target status and of the
charges being considered against them. At this time, we see
no reason to reexamine our holding in Ruggeri, and we think
that Subpoena Powers Act targets are similarly situated with
respect to their privilege against self-incrimination as are
state grand jury targets. Therefore, we hold that the
target warnings required by Ruggeri must be given to
Subpoena Powers Act targets, and we read such a requirement
into the Act. Utah Const, art. I, § 12.
Id.

The Ruggeri court only nominally mentioned article I, § 1 2 .

Yet its reference was sufficient for the Utah Supreme Court to
reaffirm the Ruggeri holding under the Utah Constitution. In re
Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 650.
Hence, In re Criminal Investigation demonstrates that when a
Utah court is asked to determine whether a Utah decision was
overruled by subsequent United States Supreme Court case law, it
is appropriate and necessary to consider whether the decision
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should be reaffirmed under the Utah Constitution.

The state

suggests in Point II of its brief that Bertine has overruled
Hycrh.

In Hygh, 711 P. 2d at 268, the Utah Supreme Court relied on

the state constitutional provision, art. I, § 14, to require the
"alternative-disposition" inquiry.

Thus, Hygh is the established

law under article I, section 14 governing impoundments in this
jurisdiction and should be reaffirmed on that basis.
In applying Hygh to the facts of this case, the state is
forced to concede the following:
The trial court's holding was based upon its finding that
"[t]here was no attempt to involve Mr. Giron, his passenger,
or others at Mr. Giron's residence in the decisions of
impound" (R. 96, finding 9(d)). That finding
is
correct.
(S.B. at 16 (emphasis added).) Bench did not recall assessing
whether Giron's second passenger could drive Giron's car from
directly across the street where it was parked on the curbside
into the driveway.

(R. 156.)

Bench did not check to see whether

there was some alternative to impounding the vehicle. (R. 156.)
He did not ask Giron whether "there were any neighbors or some
other person who could drive [the] car into his driveway across
the street from where he was parked."

(R. 157.)

The lack of

evidence defies Bench's claim that he had "nobody to turn the
vehicle over to." (S.B. 17.)
necessity.

The state failed to demonstrate

As in Hygh:

[T]he vehicle was parked next to the curb in a lawful
parking area; no valuables were visible, and defendant had
not indicated any were extant; a passenger was available to
remove any valuables for safekeeping at defendant's request
and to arrange for a third party to remove the vehicle; the
car would have been locked and left unattended; and no
evidence was presented to indicate that there was a danger
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to police or public. In this case,
its burden of showing the necessity
vehicle.

the State has not met
for the seizure of the

Hycrh, 711 P.2d at 269 (emphasis added). The facts support the
determination that the impoundment was unlawful.

The state had

the burden of establishing that a lawful impoundment occurred.
In this case, the state failed to carry its burden.
B.
BENCH ENGAGED IN A WARRANTLESS SEARCH FOR DRUGS BEFORE
AN INVENTORY WAS COMMENCED.
Even if the impoundment was justified, the trial court
correctly ruled the search was unconstitutional.

Inventory

searches of lawfully impounded vehicles are reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment so long as they are conducted pursuant to
standardized police procedures and are not a pretext to search
the vehicle for investigatory purposes.

The United States

Supreme Court has emphasized the role of standardized procedures
in determining the reasonableness of inventory searches.

See,

e.g., Bertine, 479 U.S. at 370; Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1
(1990). "[A 's]ingle familiar standard is essential to guide
officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on
and balance the social and individual interests involved in the
specific circumstances they confront.'"

Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375

(quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (quoting
Belton, 453 U.S. at 458)). In addition,
an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general
rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. The
policy or practice governing inventory searches should be
designed to produce an inventory. The individual police
officer must not be allowed so much latitude that inventory
searches are turned into "a purposeful and general means of
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discovering evidence of a crime," Bertine, 479 U.S., at 376,
107 S. Ct., at 743 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Wells, 495 U.S. at 3.
In this matter, the search yielding the controlled substance
was not conducted in conformance with inventory procedures.
was conducted for investigatory purposes.

It

The state attempts to

stretch Bench's investigatory search into the latter inventory
search conducted by Russell in order to justify Bench's conduct.
This Court should decline to make such a stretch, as set forth
below.
1. Bench Failed to Act in Compliance with Standardized
Inventory Procedures for Conducting an Inventory Search.
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Stricklincr, 844 P. 2d at 979
that "the pivotal determination with respect to the inventory
search issue" is whether the state presented sufficient evidence
to support a finding that the searching officer "acted in
compliance with established procedures for conducting an
inventory search."

Id. at 988. "Inventories should not be upheld

under Opperman unless the government shows that there exists an
established reasonable procedure for safeguarding impounded
vehicles and their contents and that the challenged police
activity was essentially in conformance with that procedure." Id.
(citing Hycrh, 711 P. 2d at 269 (quoting 2 LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 7.4, at 576-77 (1978))).
The state has the burden of establishing the existence of
standardized procedures which are designed to produce an
inventory of the items, and that officers followed such
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procedures.

Stricklinq, 844 P.2d at 988-89.

In Hygh, the court invalidated the inventory search as
unconstitutional where the officers failed to follow the
"regularized set of procedures [for Salt Lake City officers]
which guard against arbitrariness by an officer in the field."
Hygh, 711 P.2d at 269-70.

The officer "did not completely search

the vehicle and did not make any kind of a list of the items in
the automobile."

Id. at 270.

Additionally, it appeared that the

officer was searching the vehicle for investigatory purposes
since the officer, who noticed that Hygh resembled a picture of a
robbery suspect, sent for and received that picture prior to
conducting the search.

Accordingly, the "'inventory' search was

merely a pretext for a warrantless search," and the Utah Supreme
Court suppressed the evidence.

Id.

In the present case, the state has focused in its argument
on the search conducted by Russell:
As demonstrated by State's exhibit 2 (copied in appendix II
of this brief), Officer Russell did complete a standard
impoundment and inventory form, documenting the items that
he found in Giron's automobile. Officer Russell did
complete that documentation contemporaneously to the actual
search: he explained, at the evidentiary hearing on the
motion to suppress, that he was required to complete the
inventory form before turning the automobile over to the
towing company (R. 172) .
(S.B. at 22-23.)

Yet "the reported inventory search that is

being referenced here [is the search conducted] by Officer
Bench."

(R. 233.)

Apparently, the state seeks to bootstrap Bench's search off
of Russell's subsequent search.

It asserts: "nothing . . .
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prohibits inventory duties from being divided between two
officers, as happened in this case."

(S.B. at 23.)

The trial

court's findings and conclusions (R. 94) and the facts of record
in this case do not support the determination that the inventory
search was "divided between two officers."

They support the

contrary: Bench testified that he did not document his
procedures; after he "completed" his search of the vehicle, he
dispatched Russell to the scene (R. 159-160); Russell testified
that Bench made no indication whatsoever that he had initiated an
inventory search of the car. (R. 173-174.) Thus, Russell performed a full inventory search from top to bottom "as if nothing
had been done" -- as if "Bench had never been in that vehicle."
(R. 174.) 5

In this matter, the state failed to carry its burden

of establishing that Bench complied with standardized procedures.

5

The facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts set
forth in State v. Sterger, 808 P. 2d 122 (Utah App. 1991) , where the court
did not reject a "bifurcated"-inventory-search theory. In Sterger, the
defendant drove off the road in a remote area and collided with an
embankment, killing one passenger and injuring two others. As a result
of the accident, the vehicle was inoperable. Thus, when the county
deputy arrived he was involved in arranging ground and air transportation
from the area to medical facilities for the injured parties and a tow
truck for the car. In the course of moving the vehicle, the deputy
initiated an inventory search and found what appeared to be marijuana in
a container.
The deputy was forced to postpone completion of the
inventory search because he had to prioritize his time and attend to the
injured parties and the defendant. Id. at 126. The deputy completed the
inventory search two days later, after the vehicle was towed to a state
certified impound yard.
Id. at 124. He found marijuana and drug
paraphernalia, listed the items on an inventory sheet, then seized them
in evidence. Id. In this matter, at the time Bench engaged in his
search, two officers were on the scene while Giron was in handcuffs in
the officers' vehicle. If the impoundment had been lawful, conceivably
Bench could have performed an inventory search, filling out the paperwork
and completing the search without interruption, if he chose to perform
such a search. However, Bench chose to search the car for investigatory
purposes. He called a third officer to the scene for the purpose of
performing the actual inventory search.
31

Thus, the trial court recognized the search to be a subterfuge
for a criminal investigation. The true inventory search took
place only after Bench completed the investigatory search and
confiscated the items.

Accordingly, the trial court correctly

ordered suppression of the evidence seized from the car.
2. The "Pretext" Inquiry Is Necessary in the Inventory
Search Context.
The totality of the circumstances set forth above
demonstrates that the inventory search was a pretext or
subterfuge to search the vehicle for evidence.

When the United

States Supreme Court carved out the inventory search as an
exception to the Fourth Amendment requirements, it clarified that
such a search did not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as
there was no suggestion that the inventory search "was a
concealing an investigatory police motive."
at 3 76.

pretext

Opperman, 428 U.S.

The search could not be "a ruse for a general rummaging

in order to find incriminating evidence."

Wells, 495 U.S. at 3;

see also Hycrh, 711 P. 2d at 268 ("the inventory exception does not
apply when the inventory is merely

x

a pretext concealing an

investigatory police motive 7 "); Rice, 717 P.2d at 696.
The state urges this Court to abandon the "pretext" inquiry
in assessing inventory searches on the basis that such an inquiry
is contradictory to "Fourth Amendment law."

(S.B. at 21.)

[T] he possibility of a "pretext inventory analysis" is
distinctly out of step with all of the Supreme Court's other
Fourth Amendment law, canvassed in [Whren v. U.S., 116 S.Ct.
1769 (1996)], holding that objective actions, rather than
"ulterior motives," are at issue in determining whether
police action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. For
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the same reasons set forth in Whren and in the Utah Supreme
Court's rstate v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994)]
decision, there is no sound reason (under the federal or
state constitution) to invalidate an automobile inventory
search merely because the officer conducting the search
harbored an "ulterior motive" to uncover evidence of a
crime.
(S.B. at 21.)

In support of its argument, the state relies on

Lopez and State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995), which are

cases concerning police

investigations

of criminal

conduct.

Investigatory searches and activities are distinct and separate
from inventory searches, as further set forth below.
a.

"Criminal-investigation" searches.

activity implicates the warrant
Amendment.

Investigatory

requirements of the Fourth

Hygh, 711 P.2d at 267-68.

It is well-established

that in the "criminal-investigation" context, the state must
demonstrate probable cause or reasonable suspicion as an
exception to the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 741.

In the "criminal-investigation"

context, the "pretext" doctrine is unnecessary where probable
cause and/or reasonable suspicion limit the scope of the
officer7 s conduct.
An officer who observes a traffic violation has probable
cause to stop the driver. Smith, 781 P.2d at 882 n.2.
Likewise, specific articulable facts may give an officer
reasonable suspicion to believe that a driver is committing
a traffic offense. State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18
(Utah 1987). In either case, stopping the driver is
constitutionally justified. This is so despite the
officer's motivations or suspicions that are unrelated to
the traffic offense. The "reasonable scope" requirement
precludes the officer from investigating such motivations or
suspicions because the detention can "last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135.
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The rationale for disregarding the "pretext doctrine" in
Lopez was essentially the following: When an officer has detained
an individual based on a reasonable suspicion or probable cause,
he has complied with the Fourth Amendment requirement of
reasonableness regardless of other ulterior motives.

Lopez, 873

P.2d at 1135-37; see also Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1769. The pretext
doctrine is unnecessary since the officer has a valid basis to
detain the individual and is required under the Fourth Amendment
to limit the scope of the detention to that which "is necessary
to effectuate the purposes of the stop."

Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135

(quoting Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).
In State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995), the Utah
Supreme Court reiterated the following:
[I]f police have a valid right to arrest an individual for
one crime, it does not matter if their subjective intent is
in reality to collect information concerning another crime.
. . In other words, if the alleged pretext arrest could have
taken place absent police suspicion of the defendant's
involvement in another crime, than the arrest is lawful . .
. . The arrest was not rendered invalid solely because the
officers had a separate motive for arresting him. . . .
Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1205 (quoting State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d
1232, 1238 (Utah), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 476 (1993)).

The

validity of Fourth Amendment activity for "criminalinvestigation" purposes is analyzed on an "objective criteria,
not on an officer's subjective motivations or suspicions."
at 1206.

Id.

In support of the criminal-investigation purpose, the

Utah Supreme Court stated in Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1196, and Lopez,
873 P.2d at 1127, that the pretext doctrine will not serve to
invalidate the Fourth Amendment activity where reasonable
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suspicion or probable cause constitutionally justifies the
officer's activity.

See Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1204 (citing Lopez,

873 P.2d at 1134).
b.

"Inventory" searches.

The state's reliance on Harmon

and Lopez is misplaced in considering "inventory" searches.
Rather than focusing on what the hypothetical reasonable officer
would do, inventory cases focus on whether the "inventory" search
was merely a pretext to search for evidence.
Because inventories promote [important caretaking interests
of protecting an arrestee's property and ensuring the police
against claims of lost or stolen property] and are not
investigatory in purpose, they do not implicate "the
interests which are protected when searches are conditioned
on warrants."[] Therefore, inventory searches are not per se
unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment and
article I, section 14. Contraband or other evidence of crime
discovered in a true inventory search may be seized without
a warrant and introduced into evidence at trial. [] However,
the inventory exception does not apply when the inventory is
merely "a pretext concealing an investigatory police
motive."[] Fundamental constitutional guarantees against
unreasonable searches cannot be evaded by labeling them
"inventory" searches.
Hygh, 711 P.2d at 267-68.
In Whren v. U.S., 116 S.Ct. at 1773, the petitioner urged

the Court to invalidate a "criminal

investigation"

search

on

pretext grounds -- petitioner claimed the officer had ulterior
motives.
"inventory"

In support of that proposition, the petitioner cited to
search

cases, including Wells, 4 95 U.S. at 1, and

Bertine, 479 U.S. at 367. The Court rejected the petitioner's
argument and recognized the distinction between the pretext
inquiry in the "inventory" search context where the purpose is
caretaking, versus the pretext doctrine in the "criminal35

investigation" context where the search or detention is based on
probable cause.

See Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1773.

After reiterating

the pretext inquiry in the "inventory" search context, the Court
stated the following:
[0]nly an undiscerning reader would regard [the inventory
search cases, i.e. Wells, Bertine and New York v. Burger,
482 U.S. 691, 716-17 n.27, 96 L.Ed.2d 601, 107 S. Ct. 2636
(1987) (an administrative inspection case)] as endorsing the
principle that ulterior motives can invalidate police
conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause
to believe a violation of law has occurred. In each case we
were addressing the validity of a search conducted in the
absence
of probable cause. Our quoted statement simply
explains that the exemption from the need for probable cause
(and warrant), which is accorded to searches made for the
purpose of inventory or administrative regulation, is not
accorded to searches that are not made for those purposes.
See Bertine, supra, at 371-372, 93 L.Ed.2d 739, 107 S. Ct.
738; Burger, supra, at 702-703, 96 L.Ed.2d 601, 107 S. Ct.
2636.
Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1773 (emphasis added).
A similar criticism applies in this matter.

Only an

undiscerning reader would regard the "criminal-investigation"
search cases, i.e_._ Harmon, Lopez, Whren. as endorsing abandonment
of the pretext inquiry that is necessary to the "inventory"
search analysis. Courts have consistently ruled that a valid
inventory search does not occur where "the inventory
pretext concealing an investigatory police motive.'"

x

is merely a
Hygh, 711

P.2d at 268 (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376); see also State
v. Johnson. 745 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah 1987); Wells, 495 U.S. at 4.
Indeed, the inventory exception is based on the determination
that such searches are reasonable because they protect important
interests, are conducted pursuant to standardized procedures, and
are not used as a subterfuge to search for evidence.
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Therefore,

an important justification for allowing an inventory search
exception is that inventories are not conducted as a pretext or
subterfuge.

The pretext inquiry in the inventory analysis

remains valid.
In this case, the circumstances demonstrate that Bench's
search was investigatory.

Because the state failed to establish

that the evidence found in the vehicle was located during a valid
inventory search, the evidence must be suppressed.

See Wells,

495 U.S. at 4; Rice, 717 P.2d at 697.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, and as set forth in the
record on appeal, Giron respectfully requests the entry of an
order affirming the trial court's ruling suppressing the
evidence.
SUBMITTED this *?-£& day of
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, 1996.

LINDA M. JONES A
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
Rules, Statutes and Constitutional Provisions

Art I, § 14

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing
to be seized.
History: Const. 1896.
Liquor, search, seizure and forfeiture,
Cross-References. — Controlled Sub- § 32A-13-103.
stances Act, search warrants, § 58-37-10.

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

ADDENDUM B
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Third Judicial District

JAN 2 6 1996

JAMES C. BRADSHAW, Esq., No. 3768
Attorney for Defendant
10 West 300 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-2114

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]I
>
]

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]

ANGELO R. GIRON,
Defendant.

i

Case No. 951900702FS

>

Judge Bohling

The above-entitled manner came on for hearing on the 30th day of October, 1995,
The State was present and represented by its counsel, Richard Ramp and Fred
Burmester. The Defendant was present and represented by his counsel James C
Bradshaw. The Court having received the States Memorandum and Supplemental
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress and having received
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, and having heard the
testimony presented at the hearing of September 18, 1995, and further having heard the
arguments of counsel on October 30, 1995, and being otherwise advised in the matter
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issues of the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That on January 22, 1995, Salt Lake City Police Officer, D. Bench, stopped the
vehicle of Defendant Angelo Giron, based on Mr. Gironfs commission of traffic
violations and other criminal offenses committed in the officers presence.
2. Mr. Giron's vehicle at ftie time of his detention and arrest was lawfully parked
directly across from Irs residence.
3. After stopping the vehicle, Officer Bench immediately placed Mr. Giron under
arrest, handcuffed Mr. Gircn, and placed Mr. Giron into Officer Bench's vehicle.
4. After placing Mr. Giron under arrest and placing Mr. Giron in his vehicle,
Officer Bench requested and obtained registration information relevant to Mr. Gironfs
vehicle which indicated that the vehicle was lawfully registered and licensed.
5. Subsequent to obtaining the registration information, Officer Bench initiated a
search of Defendant's car which revealed controlled substances.
6. No controlled substances were in plain view of the officer.
7. That at the time he conducted a search of Mr. Giron's vehicle, Officer Bench
expressly justified the search as an inventory, which he .stated was necessary as a result of
a need to impound Mr. Giron's vehicle.
8. That Officer Bench never asked the Defendant if his passenger could accept
custody of the vehicle, if there was someone in his home that could accept custody of the
2
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vehicle, and never inquired of Mr, Giron's passenger if he'd be willing to take custody of
the vehicle.
9. The reported inventory search conducted when Officer Bench in this case was
carried out in a manner contrary to established Salt Lake City Police Procedures for an
inventory search in the following particulars:
(a) Inventory forms were not used.
(b) No written list of items found was made.
(c) There was no attempt to contemporaneously record what was found
where.
(d) There was no attempt to involve Mr. Giron, his passenger, or others at
Mr. Giron's residence in the decisions of impound.
10. Although Officer Bench articulated that his purpose in searching Mr. Giron's
car was to inventory the items in the vehicle, his actions in searching the vehicle, his
testimony, and his demeanor upon the witness stand indicate that the search was
conducted for an investigatory police purpose.
11. At the time Officer Bench searched Mr. Giron's car, any possibility of Mr.
Giron gaining access to the car for purposes of recovering a weapon, or concealing or
destroying evidence had been completely eliminated by the arrest, handcuffing, and the
removal of the Defendant from the area of the vehicle.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court issues the following:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That as a result the Defendant's vehicle being parked directly across from his
residence, impoundment was neither authorized nor necessary.
2. Even assuming arguendo the impound was justified, the "inventory" search was
merely a pretext for an investigatory search for evidence.
3. That at the time of the search the Defendant had been secured and removed
from the area, that there was no physical or temporal proximity to the arrest, and no
basis to justify the search of Defendant's vehicle as a search incident to his arrest.
4. The search of Defendant's vehicle cannot be justified under any exceptions to
the warrant requirements of the Utah State and United States Constitution. Therefore,
evidence discovered in the Defendant's vehicle must be suppressed as violative of
Defendant's right to be free from illegal searches and seizures as guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment by the United States Constitution, and by our Article 1, Section 14
of the Utah State Constitution.

DATED this

day of January, 1996.

HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLI
BOHLI^G
J
Third District Court Jtrdge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the j(j^

day of January, 1996,1 mailed the

foregoing Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, postage prepaid,
to:

Richard G. Hamp
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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